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INSURANCE
W. Shelby McKenzie*
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE- STACKING
Act 623 of 1977 amended Louisiana Revised Statutes
22:1406(D)(1)(c) (Supp. 1977) to prohibit stacking of multiple unin-
sured motorist (UM) coverages available to the same insured except
under limited circumstances. When the insured is injured "while
occupying an automobile not owned by said injured party," the
statutory exception permits the injured party to recover under the
uninsured motorist (UM) coverage on the vehicle in which he is
riding (primary coverage) and also under one other UM policy
available to him (excess coverage). The decisions of the third circuit"
and the supreme court' in Courville v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. present an interesting dichotomy between
application of the obvious intent of the exception and the imprecise
language in which it was written.
Courville, Sr., owned two vehicles-a 1964 pickup and a 1968
Olds-each insured under separate State Farm policies. His son,
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1. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1Xc) (Supp. 1977) provides:
If the insured has any limits of uninsured motorist coverage in a policy of
automobile liability insurance, in accordance with the terms of Subsection D),
then such limits of liability shall not be increased because of multiple motor
vehicles covered under said policy of insurance and such limits of uninsured
motorist coverage shall not be increased when the insured has insurance available
to him under more than one uninsured motorist coverage provision or policy; pro-
vided, however, that with respect to other insurance available, the policy of in-
surance or endorsement shall provide the following:
With respect to bodily injury to an injured party while occupying an
automobile not owned by said injured party, the following priorities of recovery
under uninsured motorist coverage shall apply:
(i) The uninsured motorist coverage on the vehicle in which the injured par-
ty was an occupant is primary;
(ii) Should that primary uninsured motorist coverage be exhausted due to
the extent of damages, then the injured occupant may recover as excess
from other uninsured motorist coverage available to him. In no instance shall
more than one coverage from more than one uninsured motorist policy be
available as excess over and above the primary coverage available to the in-
jured occupant.
2. Courville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 176 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1980).
3. Courville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 703 (La. 1981).
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Courville, Jr., while driving the 1964 pickup, was seriously injured
by the negligence of an uninsured motorist. Courville, Jr., sought to
stack the UM coverages under both State Farm policies. He was
clearly entitled to the full limits of the policy on the 1964 pickup
which he was driving at the time of the accident. He could recover
under the policy on the 1968 Olds only if he was within the excep-
tion to the anti-stacking provision of Act 623 of 1977. Technically,
since the truck was owned by his father, Courville, Jr., was within
the statutory exception of one injured "while occupying an
automobile not owned by said injured party."5
The third circuit refused to apply the exception literally, finding
that the exception must be read in pari materia with the entire anti-
stacking Act. The purpose of Act 623 of 1977 was to override leg-
islatively the jurisprudence which permitted stacking of multiple
coverages, whether under the same policy or multiple policies,
available to the same insured. The main theme of the Act is that a
person can recover under only one UM policy. Generally, the policy
on the vehicle involved in the accident will afford the only applicable
coverage. However, if an injured person were always relegated to
that coverage alone, then he would be at the mercy of the foresight
of everyone with whom he rode. Therefore, the obvious intent of the
exception contained in Act 623 was to afford an insured, when riding
with others, the protection of his own UM coverage, in addition to
whatever coverage was available on the vehicle in which he was
riding.
If Courville, Sr., had been the injured party, then clearly under
Act 623 of 1977 he could recover only under one policy because as
owner he would not be within the statutory exception. The third cir-
cuit concluded that it would be a "legal absurdity" to permit another
person to stack the two policies when the insured owner could not.
Instead, it construed the exception to Act 623 to be inapplicable to
4. Uninsured motorist policies generally provide coverage for the named insured
and any relative as defined in policy (whether or not they are occupying the insured
automobile). However, UM policies also generally exclude coverage for persons occupy-
ing any other automobile owned by the named insured. Such exclusion has been
declared invalid. See discussion of Branch v. O'Brien, in the text at note 9, infra.
5. Both courts considered whether Act 623 of 1977 was applicable to the policies
in question. The policies were issued initially prior to the effective date of the Act.
However, the six-month terms of both policies were renewed after its effective date.
Both the court of appeal and the supreme court agreed that each renewal was a
separate contract even though no new policy was issued. Renewal after the effective
date subjects the policy to the provisions of the Act. Another panel for the third cir-
cuit has held that Act 623 of 1977 is applicable to pre-Act policies because the amend-
ment does not impair contractual rights. Thibodeaux v. Olivier, 394 So. 2d 684 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 397 So. 2d 1360 (La. 1981).
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any other coverage provided by the owner of the occupied vehicle.
Thus, the non-owner occupants could not stack coverage purchased
for other vehicles by the owner of the occupied automobile. This in-
terpretation would place the owner and the occupant in the same
position with respect to such other coverage.
The supreme court reversed, finding that the journey into
legislative intent was unnecessary. Not deterred by the possibility
of a legal absurdity, the court held that the language of the excep-
tion contained in Act 623 was clear and unambiguous and that,
under Civil Code article 13,' the courts were not free to disregard
the letter of the law in pursuit of its spirit. Therefore, Courville, Jr.,
was permitted to recover the full limits of both State Farm policies.
The supreme court suggested legislation was necessary if the Act
did not express its true spirit.7
It is difficult to find fault with either the decision of the third
circuit or of the supreme court, since any criticism must be based on
the extremely close and perhaps purely subjective determination of
whether Act 623 was ambiguous. The legal absurdity that remains is
not so much the result of statutory interpretation in the Courville
case as it is of the prior jurisprudence which stretched the provi-
sions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D) to mandate the
availability of multiple coverage despite policy language to the con-
trary.8
Apparently, as illustrated by Branch v. O'Brien,' the prior
jurisprudence will not be reexamined in light of Act 623. In Branch,
the plaintiff owned four vehicles, each insured under separate State
Farm policies. Three of the policies, including the one on the vehicle
in which the plaintiff was riding when she was injured by an unin-
sured motorist, had UM limits of $10,000. One vehicle, however, had
UM limits of $100,000. Each of these policies expressly excluded
coverage for injury to the insured while occupying any other vehicle
owned by the insured."
The court applied Act 623 of 1977 to limit the insured-as owner
6. LA. CiV. CODE art. 13: "When a law is clear and free from all ambiguity, the
letter of it is not to be disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing its spirit."
7. An attempt in the 1981 legislative session to overrule Courville failed. See La.
H.B. 990, 7th Reg. Sess. (1981).
8. The court was referring to Deane v. McGee, 261 La. 686, 260 So. 2d 669 (1972)
and Graham v. American Cas. Co., 261 La. 85, 259 So. 2d 22 (1972) and their progeny.
9. 396 So. 2d 1372 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 400 So. 2d 905 (La. 1981).
10. "'This policy does not apply . . .(a) to bodily injury to an insured while oc-
cupying an automobile (other than an insured automobile) owned by the named insured
.... Id. at 1374.
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of the automobile in which she was injured-to recovery under one
policy. However, the court further held that she was not restricted
to the policy on the vehicle in which she was riding. Citing the
jurisprudence prior to Act 623," the court found that the exclusion
of coverage while occupying other owned automobiles was contrary
to the mandatory requirement of UM coverage under section 1406(D)
and the public policy expressed therein. The court obseTved that
nothing in the 1977 anti-stacking amendment affected the mandatory
coverage requirement. Therefore, although the plaintiff was limited
to one policy, she was free to choose the policy most advantageous
to her. The supreme court denied writs. 2
11. Barbin v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 315 So. 2d 754 (La. 1975); Deane
v. McGee, 261 La. 686, 260 So. 2d 669 (1972); Graham v. American Cas. Co. of Reading,
Pennsylvania, 261 La. 85, 259 So. 2d 22 (1972); Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253
La. 521, 218 So. 2d 580 (1968); Griffin v. Armond, 358 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1978); Guillot v. Travelers Indem. Co., 338 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). writ
refused, 341 So. 2d 408 (La. 1977); Thomas v. Nelson, 295 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ refused, 299 So. 2d 791 (La. 1974); Elledge v. Warren, 263 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ refused, 262 La. 1096, 266 So. 2d 223 (1972).
Only. the Elledge, Thomas, Guillot and Griffin cases dealt specifically with the in-
validity of the exclusion under consideration. However, in other recent cases, the se-
cond and fourth circuits have reached the same conclusion. Earl v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 391 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Bourgeois v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 385 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980). Although the result in Courville v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra, is consistent with this jurisprudence, the
supreme court did not expressly consider the issue of the validity of the exclusion. The
decisions of neither the court of appeal nor the supreme court reveal whether the
issue was raised.
12. 400 So. 2d 905 (La. 1981).
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